Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1976

Bowen Trucking, Inc., Dalbo, Inc., Northwest
Carriers, Inc., Philip W. Martin and D.E. Casada
Construction v. Frank S. Warner, Olof E. Zundel,
and James M. Kimball : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
William S. Richards; D. Michael Jorgensen; Nelson, Harding, Richards, Leonard & Tate; Attorneys
for Appellants.
Vernon B. Romney; Attorney General; Brinton B. Burbidge; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys
for Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Bowen Trucking, Inc. v. Warner, No. 197614533.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/370

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
45.9
.S9
DOCKET NO.

UTAH SUPREME COURT

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRA,'V

BRtCF

1*JUN1977

OF THE STATE OF UTAH "

m^m

VCOMG m*5 *».•*«».,» *

L Reuben Cferfc Uv* S^-o

BOWEN TRUCKING, INC.,
DALBO, INC., NORTHWEST
CARRIERS, INC., PHILIP W.
MARTIN and D. E. CASADA
CONSTRUCTION,
Case No. 14533

PlaintiffsAppellants,
-vsFRANK S. WARNER, OLOF E.
ZUNDEL, and JAMES M.
KIMBALL, Commissioners
of the Public Service
Commission of Utah,
DefendantsRespondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION OF UTAH
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
BRINTON R. BURBIDGE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
William S. Richards
D. Michael Jorgensen
NELSON, HARDING, RICHARDS
LEONARD & TATE
Attorneys for Appellants
1515 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

FILED
*5HA,*SUP»»» C O B * *»*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF FACTS
ARGUMENT:
POINT I:

Pa?e
1
1
1

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OBTAINED
JURISDICTION TO REHEAR THE CASE FROM
RULE 60(b)(7) OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE

POINT II: THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION HAS BROAD
DISCRETION IN MAKING ITS DETERMINATIONS
AND THESE DETERMINATIONS ARE PRESUMED
VALID BY THIS COURT
POINT III: THE RULING OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION GRANTING THE MOTION TO REOPEN
IS PRESUMED CORRECT AND CAN ONLY BE
OVERTURNED IF SHOWN TO BE ARBITRARY
OR CAPRICIOUS, WHICH SHOWING APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MAKE

10
13

CONCLUSIONTABLE OF CASES
Armored Motors Service v. Public Service Comm'n., 23 Utah
2d 418, 464 P. 2d 582 (1970)
Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 P.2d 1211 (1952)
Hotel Utah Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 116 Utah 443,
211 P.2d 200 (1949)
Lewis v. Wycoff, 18 Utah 2d 255, 420 P.2d 264 (1966)
Murphy v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 539 P.2d
367 (1975)
Ney v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114 (1956)
Port of Umatilla v. Richmond, 212 Ore. 596, 321 P.2d
338 (1958)
Robinson v. Olzendam, 38 Wash.2d 30, 227 P.2d 732 (1951)Utah Gas Service v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 18 Utah 2d
310, 422 P.2d 530 (1967)
Warren v . Dixon Ranch Co, 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953)
RULES AND ORDER
Rule 60(b)(7) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Public Service Commission Order Dated August 1, 1975,
(R. 154)

8
7
12
n
4
5
11
H
9
6
2
4

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE' STATE OF UTAH

BOWEN TRUCKING, INC., DALBO,
INC., NORTHWEST CARRIERS, INC.,
PHILIP W. MARTIN and D. E.
CASADA CONSTRUCTION,
PlaintiffsAppellants,

Case No. 14533

-vsPUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, FRANK S. WARNER,
OLOF E. ZUNDEL, and JAMES
N. KIMBALL, Commissioners
of the Public Service
Commission of Utah, and
DUANE HALL TRUCKING, INC.,
DefendantsRespondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, FRANK S. WARNER, OLOF E. ZUNDEL, AND
JAMES N. KIMBALL, COMMISSIONERS.

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Public Service Commission, Frank S. Warner,
Olof E, Zundel, and James N. Kimball, adopt the Statement
of the Case set forth in the brief of respondent Duane
Hall Trucking, Inc.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to have the Report and Order
of March 3, 1976, affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents Public Service Commission of Utah,
Frank S. Warner, Olof E. Zundel and James N. Kimball,
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Commissioners, adopt the Statement of Facts set forth
in the brief of respondent Duane Hall Trucking, Inc.
I.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OBTAINED
JURISDICTION TO REHEAR THE CASE FROM RULE
60(b) (7) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
In general, once a court has rendered its
decision, that decision becomes binding and final
unless a timely appeal has been made.

However, the

legislature realized that occasionally final judgments
would produce harsh and undesirable results.

Hence,

to alleviate possible inequities that might occur,
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was
enacted.

Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. provides:

"(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable
Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons; CH mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered
in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons
in an action has not been personally served
upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e)
and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action; (5) the judgment is void;
(6) the judgment has been satisfied, released,
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have
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prospective application; or (7) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment^ The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons
(1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this subdivision (b) does not
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not
limit the power of a court to entertain
an independent action to relieve a party
from a judgment, order or proceeding or
to set aside a judgment for fraud upon
the court. The procedure for obtaining
any relief from a judgment shall be by
motion as prescribed in these rules or
by an independent action." (Emphasis
added.)
This rule allows a judicial body to set aside
a final judgment in order to achieve justice.

The

problem lies in the fact that the court must decide
between two valid considerations.

On the one hand,

i

there must be an end to litigation.

Once a decision

has been made, interested parties should be able to
rely on that decision.

On the other hand, the court

attempts to see that justice is promoted; that a
party receives its fair day in court.
its a matter of discretion.

Obviously,

The court must look at

the totality of the circumstances and then render
what it considers to be a just and fair decision.
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Prior to the time that the Commission
granted the rehearing, it felt that the applicant
had presented sufficient evidence to warrant a new
hearing but felt bound by what it thought was the law.
Quoting from the Public Service Commission's Order
dated August 1, 19 75, wherein it states:
"The commission is of the opinion
that sufficient reason for rehearing
has been made to appear. However,
Section 54-7-15, U.C.A. (1953) provides
that applications for rehearing must
be made prior to the effective date of
the order or decision or within twenty
days thereafter. The application in the
present case was not within said time."
(R. 154) (Emphasis added).
Based on Section 54-7-15 of the Code and the fact
that the Public Service Commission was under the
mistaken impression of just what an applicant had
to prove in order to transfer a number of contracts
i

under the same permit, the Commission denied defendant's
request for a rehearing.

Then, in August 19 75, the

Utah Supreme Court handed down the Pickering decision
(Murphy v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 539 P.2d
367 (19 75)), which held that it was unnecessary to
prove each and every contract in order to obtain
a permit.
Using Rule 60(b)(7) and the Pickering decision,
as its basis, defendant Duane Hall again filed for
a rehearing.
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The motion was made within a reasonable
time; within six (6) months of the Commission's
original order.
217, 299 P.2d

See Key v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d
1114 (1956) involving an

eleven

(11) month period between the time a default judgment was rendered and a petition under Rule 60(b)(7)
was filed.

The Commission found that the defendant

had presented reasonable grounds and that the motion
must be granted to avoid inequity (R. 184).
Equity is of principal concern in granting
relief under Rule 60(b).

Ney v. Harrison, (supra),

is of significance in examining the role of equity
in Rule 60(b) cases.

In Ney v. Harrison, (supra),

as in this case mistake was a basis for invoking
relief under Rule 60 (b).

The defendant in Ney

had mistakenly believed that she was fully protected
by an earlier divorce decree.

The plaintiff argued

that the type of mistake was a mistake of law not
covered by Rule 60(b).
out that

Plaintiff further pointed

under the common law all judgments were

final and that statutes in derogation of common law
must be strictly construed.

This court declared that

such a rule has no application in the State of Utah
and that the rules of equity should be followed.
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Our Civil Code expressly provides:
"The rule of the common law that
statutes are to be strictly, construed
has not application to the statutes
of this state. The statutes establish
the laws of this state respecting the
subjects' to which they relate, and
their provisions and all proceedings
under them are to be liberally construed
with a view to effect the objects of
the statutes and to promote justice.
Whenever there is any variance between
the rules of equity and the rules of
common law in reference to the same
matter the rules of equity shall
prevail^ (At page 1116) (Emphasis
added.)
Equity demanded that the Public Service Commission
reopen the case in light ofs

(1) the defendant,

Duane Hall, paid almost forty times more than what
his original permit was worth; (2) the defendant
sought the counsel and advice of several attorneys;
(3) he contacted the Public Service Commission in an
attempt to straighten the matter out; and (4) the
Commission had based its earlier decision on an
erroneous assumption.
This court stated in Warren v. Dixon Ranch
Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741, 742 (1953) that:
"Equity considers factors which
may be irrelevant in actions at law,
such as the unfairness of a party's
conduct, his delay in bringing or
continuing the action, the hardship
in granting or denying relief.
Although an equity court no longer has
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complete discretion in granting or
denying relief it may exercise wide
judicial discretion in weighing the
factors of fairness and public
convenience, and this court on
appeal will reverse the trial court
only where an abuse of this discretion
is clearly shown." (Emphasis added.)
The application of Rule 60 (b) was also
considered in Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 P.2d
1211 (1952).

There the court stated that the sign-

ing and entering of a formal order based upon the
erroneous assumption that it conformed to a direction
of the court was sufficient grounds to invoke Rule
60(b)(7).

The court said that to have done otherwise

would have worked a grave injustice upon the party
seeking relief.

"Furthermore, in absence of a rule

to that effect [Rule 60(b) (7)3, the court, perhaps,
had inherent power to set the formal order aside
anyway." (At page 1214)
The situation in the Dixon case is analogous
to the present one in that the Public Service
Commission based its order upon an erroneous assumption
thinking it had complied with the wishes of the court.
However, when the defendant filed its Motion for
Rehearing, the Commission realized that it had not and
granted a rehearing finding that sufficient reasons
had-been presented to justify a modification of its
former order.
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II.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION HAS
BROAD DISCRETION IN MAKING ITS DETERMINATIONS AND THESE DETERMINATIONS ARE
PRESUMED VALID BY THIS COURT.
The Public Service Commission was established
as an administrative body to regulate public utilities.
Because of its continuous dealings in this field,
it is assumed that the Public Service Commission
has acquired a special expertise in handling problems
that arise within the area of public utilities. This
fact has been recognized by the courts as witnessed
by a statement in Armored Motors Service v. Public
Service Commission, 23 Utah 2d 418, 464 P.2d 582
(1970), wherein the court declared:
" . . . It must also be realized
that the legislature has given the
commission the responsibility for the
overall planning and regulation of
certain public services, including
transportation. Because that is
the purpose for which the commission
was established and functions, it is
assumed to have specialized knowledge
and expertise in the field. Consequently it is accorded comparatively
broad prerogatives in carrying on
investigations and making determinations in the discharge of its duties.
For these reasons its findings and
orders are endowed with the presumption of verity; and upon appeal to
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this court we assume that the
commission believed those aspects
of the evidence which support its
findings and we review the record
in the light most favorable to thertu
"(At page 584) (Emphasis added.)
Utah Gas

Service v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 18

Utah 2d 310, 422 P.2d 530 (1967), wherein this
court stated:
"When the commission, in
performing its duties has given
consideration to pertinent facts
and has made its findings and
decision, they are endowed with
a presumption of validity and
correctness. In accordance
with the recognized prerogatives
of the trier of the facts, on
appeal the evidence is viewed in the
light most favorable to sustaining
them; and the decision will not
be reversed unless when the evidence
is so viewed, there is no reasonable
basis to support the commission's
action, so that it thus appears to
be capricious and arbitrary, a
situation which is not shown to
exist here." (At page 533) (¥mphasis
added.)
Hence, a ruling or an order issued by the Public
Service Commission is presumed valid because of that
body's unique position.

As an administrative body,

the Public Service Commission is able to draw upon
years of experience and expertise in weighing the
facts as they are presented.
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Its decision to reopen

is endowed with a presumption of validity and should
not be reversed.
III.
THE RULING OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION GRANTING THE MOTION TO REOPEN
IS PRESUMED CORRECT AND CAN ONLY BE
OVERTURNED IF SHOWN TO BE ARBITRARY
OR CAPRICIOUS, WHICH SHOWING APPELLANTS
HAVE FAILED TO MAKE.
When the Public Service Commission issues
an order or a ruling, and a party seeks review, this
court may only reverse the Commission's decision
if the appellant can show that the Commission
abused its discretion.

"Abuse of discretion" has

been defined by this court to be:
"By an abuse of discretion,
* * *is meant a clearlyerroneous
conclusion and judgment—one that
is clearly against the logic and
effect of such facts as are presented
in support of the application, or
against the reasonable and probable
deductions to be drawn from the facts
disclosed upon the hearing."
State v. Draper, 83 Utah 115, 27 P.2d
39, 49, 50 (1933).

- 10 -

This definition has been adopted by the Oregon Supreme
Court in the case of Port of Umatilla v. Richmond/ 212
Ore* 596, 321 P.2d 338 (1958).

Also see Robinson v.

Olzendam, 38 Wash.2d 30, 227 P.2d 732 (1951).
As examination of the record clearly shows
that the Commission did not abuse discretion.

Before

granting the motion for rehearing the Commission examined
extensive supporting and opposing memorandum.

The

Commission also made an exhaustive examination of the
record of the proceedings and the decision of this
honorable court in Murphy v. Public Service Commission of
Utah, supra.

After these involved deliberations the

Commission made its finding that equity required the
granting of the motion to reopen.
In an action such as this one, the burden
of proof is on the appellants to show that an abuse
of discretion occurred.

In Lewis v. Wycoff, 18 Utah 2d

255, 420 P.2d 264 (1966), this court stated:
"Due to the responsibility
imposed upon the commission, and
its presumed knowledge and expertise in this field, its findings
and order are supported by certain
well-recognized rules of review:
They are endowed with a presumption
of validity and correctness; and
the burden is upon the plaintiff to
show that they are in error. We
survey the evidence in the light
most favorable to sustaining them;
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and we will not reverse unless
there is no reasonable basis
therein to support them so
that it appears that the
commission's action was
capricious and arbitrary."
(At page 266) (Emphasis added.)
Several years earlier the court in Hotel Utah
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 116 Utah 443, 211 P.2d 200
(1949), declared:
"The authority to determine which
type of unit is appropriate is vested
in the board and not in this court.
If the discretion so granted is
reasonably exercised, the finding
cannot be set aside. It is only
in those cases wherein we can find
the board has abused its discretion
that we may interfere. And Tf
appellant seeks to reverse l:he
finding of the board because of
an abuse of discretion in selecting
the appropriate unit the burden is
on it to establish the abused n
(At page 203) (Emphasis added.)
Not one scintilla of fact or evidence points
to arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the
commission.

Based on the totality of the circumstances,

the Commission did not abuse discretion, and its
decision should stand.

Appellants have failed to meet

their burden and the action of the Commission should be
sustained.

Appellants have failed to show that the

Commission abused discretion and the action of the
Commission must be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
The Public Service Commission had jurisdiction
to rehear the case under Rule 60(b)(7) of the U.R.C.P.
No one was in a better position than the Public Service
Commission to make a decision in the present case.
Using its expertise in this field and its special
knowledge of the facts of the case, the Commission
issued a well-reasoned order; designed to eliminate
the inequitites that had resulted from its previous
decision.

Because of its unique position as the

trier of fact, its decision is presumed to be valid.
A party questioning the validity of the order assumes
the burden of showing that it is in fact arbitrary and
unreasonable.

This the appellants have failed to do.

Therefore the Public Service Commission respectfully
requests the Court to affirm its order and judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
BRINTON R. BURBIDGE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
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